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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
concept of fault, which is the principle at stake. With ingenuity the difficulties
largely disappear. But now that the court has made it so clear that the liabil-
ities of joint and co-tortfeasors are not necessarily identical with the other
members of their respective classes, it is hoped that the law of contribution
will be updated accordingly by legislative change.
Donald P. Simet
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES-PRVITY No LONGER REQUIRED
An American Airlines carrier crashed in New York killing plaintiff's
intestate, a passenger. An action for wrongful death was commenced against
American for negligence, and against both the manufacturer of the aircraft,
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, and the manufacturer of an allegedly defective
altimeter in the said aircraft, Kollsman Instrument Corp., both for breach of
implied warranty of fitness. Motions brought by both Lockheed and Kollsman
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute causes
of action pursuant to Rule 106(4) of the Rules of Civil Practice were granted.
On affirmance by the Appellate Division, plaintiff appealed by permission to the
Court of Appeals. Held, (4-3)-reversed as to the manufacturer of the aircraft,
Lockheed, affirmed as to the manufacturer of the altimeter, Kollsman. The
implied warranty of fitness of the manufacturer which put the assembled
aircraft into the market runs in favor of all intended users of the product
despite lack of privity of contract between such users and the manufacturer;
no remedy lies against the manufacturer of the defective component part since
there is adequate remedy against the manufacturer of the aircraft. Goldberg v.
Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81
(1963).
In Winterbottom v. Wright,' the general rule that a manufacturer of a
defective product is not liable to users not in privity of contract entered the
realm of Anglo-American jurisprudence. From the outset, the privity doctrine,
at best, proved to be a hard pill for courts to prescribe. An exception early
arose as to articles of manufacture "inherently dangerous to life and health."2
Judge Cardozo's landmark MacPherson decision3 in 1916, citing prior New York
cases which had created exceptions to the privity doctrine, 4 imposed liability in
negligence, regardless of privity, upon a manufacturer in favor of the ultimate
consumer. MacPherson dealt the death blow to the vestige of the strict Winter-
bottom influence in New York and rapidly became accepted in the vast majority
1. 10 Mees. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842); see, e.g., National Say. Bank
v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
2. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852). See generally Prosser,
Torts § 84 (2d ed. 1955).
3. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
4. E.g., Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852) (mislabeled
poison bottle); Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478, 88 N.E. 1063 (1909)
(exploding coffee urn: liability to bystanders).
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of American jurisdictions..5 However, MacPherson predicated liability on negli-
gence. There followed upon MacPherson a trend to impose strict warranty
liability which would, in effect, make the manufacturer "a guarantor of his
product, even though he had exercised all reasonable care."'6 This trend has
found acceptance mainly in food cases, and strict warranty liability in food
cases is the rule in the majority of American jurisdictions that have considered
the problem. 7 Of the concept of strict warranty liability, Dean Prosser main-
tains:
The preoccupation with contract in connection with warranty has no
sound foundation. The action for breach of warranty was originally a
tort action for breach of a duty assumed, and it is by no means clear
that it was anything more than the accident that the cases which arose
involved contracts which led to its being regarded as a matter of con-
tract at all. The original tort theory is very much alive, and a return
to it is possible whenever the courts choose to find that the manufac-
turer has assumed a duty to those who use his product.
8
Courts have frequently ignored the privity doctrine in products cases. The
several exceptions to the doctrine in American jurisdictions provide ample
basis for its complete abolition in the products area and, in effect, it has been
completely abolished in certain leading jurisdictions.9
The privity doctrine in New York was recently notably shaken by the
Court of Appeals in two significant decisions. In Greenberg v. Lorenz,'0 a
purchaser purchased from a retailer a can of salmon containing a piece of tin;
purchaser's daughter was injured, and despite lack of privity between the
retailer and the purchaser's daughter, the Court imposed strict warranty
liability upon the retailer, holding that such liability would apply as to food
and household goods and extend at least to the members of a purchaser's
household. In Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.," defendant
manufacturer publicly advertised the quality of its goods, the labels upon
which also made claims as to quality. Relying upon these representations,
plaintiff purchased certain goods of the defendant from defendant's subpur-
5. Prosser, Torts § 84, at 500 (2d ed. 1955).
6. Id. at 506. See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J.
1099 (1960).
7. Prosser & Smith, Cases and Materials on Torts 839 (3d ed. 1962); see Pompilio
v. McGeory, 283 App. Div. 826, 129 N.Y.S.2d 13 (2d Dep't 1954); accord, Greenberg v.
Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
8. Prosser, Torts § 84, at 507 (2d ed. 1955) (Footnotes omitted.); see, e.g., Randy
Knitwear Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.S.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, .226 N.Y.S.2d
363 (1962); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961);
Greco v. S.S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,
168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932). See generally Lambert, Sucessful Storming of the
Citadel of Privity in New York, Plaintiff's Advocate, July 1963, p.7.
9. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Swift & Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959).
10. 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 NYE.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
11. 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962). See generally 36 St.
John's L. Rev. 325 (1962).
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chaser. The goods proving defective, plaintiff proceeded directly against de-
fendant, and despite lack of privity, recovery was allowed upon a theory of
breach of express warranty. Although it appeared that privity was thus virtually
destroyed in New York, neither of these decisions explicitly so held; such
generalization was left open to question,' 2 for the Greenberg decision seemed
limited to food cases and the Randy Knitwear decision, expressed in language
of contractual reliance, seemed to abolish privity in express warranty cases only.
There remained, at least, the remnant of privity in the implied warranty area.
On its face, the Goldberg case seems to answer all doubts with regard to
the abolition of the privity doctrine with respect to products liability in New
York. Writing the majority opinion, Chief Judge Desmond stated that leave
to appeal had been granted in order that the "problem partially cleared up"'8
in the Greenberg and Randy Knitwear cases might be brought nearer to com-
plete solution. He stated that the issue was whether "a manufacturer's implied
warranty of fitness of his product for its contemplated use runs in favor of all
its intended users, despite lack of privity of contract."' 4 Referring to the
MacPherson decision as an "'extension' of existing court-made liability law,"'1
the Chief Judge described the Greenberg and Randy Knitwear decisions as
extensions of warranty liability in favor of non-contracting consumers. The
California Court's "strict tort liability"' 6 was expressly equated to Goldberg's
"strict warranty liability," and the reasoning underlying the California Court's
theory of liability was set forth approvingly:
The California Court said that the purpose of such a holding is to see
to it that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are
borne by the manufacturers who put the products on the market
rather than by injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves
and that implicit in putting such articles on the market are repre-
sentations that they will safely do the job for which they were built."7
However, the Court refused to extend liability to the manufacturer of the
alleged defective altimeter:
[F] or the present at least we do not think it necessary so to extend
this rule as to hold liable the manufacturer (defendant Kollsman) of
a component part. Adequate protection is provided for the passengers
by casting in liability the airplane manufacturer which put into the
market the completed aircraft.' 8
The dissent'9 deems incongruous the majority's creation of strict warranty
liability in favor of airline passengers against a manufacturer with which such
12. See 2 Warren, Negligence in the New York Courts § 2.67 (Supp. 1962, at 132-136).
13. Instant case at 434, 191 N.E.2d at 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
14. Id. at 434-35, 191 N.E.2d at 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
15. Id. at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
16. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963).
17. Instant case at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
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passengers have no contract. Citing the fact that the actual contracting party,
the airline, owes no greater duty to passengers than "an undertaking of reason-
ably safe carriage . . . discharged by the use of due care," 20 it is asserted by
the dissent that this duty would not be altered if the airline manufactured its
own planes. This assertion fails to distinguish between the liability imposed by
the duty of care of a carrier and a manufacturer's warranty liability for his
product. The distinction is between an action for negligence and an action for
breach of warranty. Further criticized is the majority's choice of defendant
and the theory upon which he is charged:
We cannot accept the implication of the majority that the difference
between warranty and strict products liability is merely one of
phrasing.
Inherent in the question of strict products or enterprise liability
is the question of the proper enterprise on which to fasten it. In a
theory of liability based, not on the regulation of conduct, but on
economic considerations of distributing the risk of accidents that
occur through no one's neglect, the enterprise most strategically placed
to perform this function-the carrier rather than the enterprise that
supplies an assembled chattel thereto, is the logical subject of the
liability, if liability there is to be.
Only in this way do we meet and resolve . . . the anomaly pre-
sented by . . . the majority, which, through reliance on warranty
incident to sales, grants a recovery to a passenger injured through a
nonnegligent failure of equipment but denies it to one injured through
a nonnegligent failure of maintenance or operation. 2
The dissent placed some reliance on the fact that following manufacture,
inspection and certification of the aircraft were made by the Federal Aviation
Agency, and sees this as distinguishing the aircraft manufacturer's situation
from the usual warranty case where the manufacturer foreseeably knows that
his product will not be inspected after it leaves his custody 2 2 This supposed
distinction, however, fails to account for the activities of federal regulative
agencies operative in other product areas such as food, drugs and cosmetics.
The fact of government inspection and regulation in those areas has not created
any obstacle to the imposition of strict liability for warranty. Additionally,
this distinction unwarrantedly assumes that such government inspection and
regulation constitutes a panacea to product defects, an assumption rebutted
by the very facts in this case.
Further, the dissent points out that "all are aware of the hazards attending
air travel and accident and special insurance is readily available at moderate
20. Instant case at 438, 191 N.E.2d at 85-6, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
21. Id. at 440-42, 191 N.E.2d at 85-6, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 597-99. But see Keeton,
Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 401 (1959) (recent developments
in strict liability not warranting conclusion of social engineering rather than fault as the
trend); James, Nature of Negligence, 3 Utah L. Rev. 275, 284 (1953) (argument that
strict liability is based on conduct, cautioning against confusion of negligence concepts into
area of strict liability).
22. Instant case at 438, 191 N.E.2d at 84, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
273
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rates."2 8 This argument is unconvincing, considering that air transportation,
widely and publicly advertised as being safe, has become the accepted mode of
travel. It is also unrealistic to suggest that passengers insure themselves against
risk of harm from defects in the manufacture of the aircraft, especially con-
sidering the lack of any such requirement in other product areas. To the dissent,
the airline is the "dominant enterprise" 24 upon which liability should be
attached, and the selection by the majority, applying its rule of strict warranty
liability "not to the enterprise with which plaintiff dealt and relied upon, or to
the enterprise which manufactured the alleged defective part, but to the assem-
bler of the aircraft used by the carrier, involves a principle of selection which
is purely arbitrary."2 5 But in considering the dissenters' argument for imposition
of strict liability upon the airline, it should be observed that the airline also
is an aggrieved party. American did not make the defective part or assemble
the plane but purchased the same from Lockheed. As a result of the accident,
American lost a multi-million dollar asset, valuable trained personnel, and
good will.
Regardless of the question of the propriety of imposing strict liability
against the manufacturer-assembler rather than the carrier, the Goldberg
decision, applicable to all manufacturers, represents the final step in the pro-
gression away from privity and toward strict warranty liability. The dissent's
assertion that warranty at best is a useful fiction 20 is properly made. But by
the implication of the majority that the concept of strict warranty liability
would perhaps be more adequately described by the California Court's "strict
tort liability," it seems clear that the warranty concept in this decision is
nominal only. The theory that historically the warranty action was a tort action
which became confused and adulterated by the imposition of contractual con-
ceptions7 seemingly has here been embraced and the contractual influence
upon the action removed.
The dissent asserted further that because of the economic considerations
involved, the selection of the enterprise to which strict liability should be im-
posed would best be left to the Legislature.28 This position disregards the
historical role of the Court in dealing with the problem of privity. It also
disregards the tradition of such a case as the MacPherson decision where the
Court definitively decided new law rather than leave the problem there involved
to the Legislature.29 It must be remembered that the Court here was called
upon to consider the sufficiency of causes of action brought against manufac-
turers for breach of implied warranty of fitness, not the extent of the liability
of the airline. The decision rendered is a logical step forward from the Court's
23. Ibid.
24. Instant case at 440, 191 N.E.2d at 85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
25. Id. at 443, 191 N.E.2d at 87, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 600.
26. Id. at 439-40, 191 N.E.2d at 85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
27. See authorities cited note 8 supra and accompanying text.
28. Instant case at 443, 191 N.E.2d at 87, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 600.
29. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
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decisions in the Greenberg and Randy Knitwear cases; Goldberg supplies the
needed generalization not provided in those two cases: strict warranty liability
to all intended users despite privity.
A serious question is posed by the dissent as to the propriety of a theory
of products liability based on strict liability rather than on negligence. To the
dissent, the purpose of strict liability is not regulation of conduct with a "view
to eliminating accidents, but rather to remove the economic consequences of
accidents from the victim who is unprepared to bear them and place the risk on
the enterprise in the course of whose business they arise."13 0 The dissent feels
that removal of the defense of due care by the imposition of strict liability is too
drastic a measure. The dissent would rather impose liability in negligence only,
asserting that lack of care can easily be "brought to light through devices such
as res ipsa loquitur."3' But this reasoning supposes lack of care, and fails to
provide a remedy where harm results from conduct which is nonnegligent in
nature.
The Goldberg fact situation is one where due care might possibly constitute
a good defense to an action for negligence. And if the conduct of Lockheed, of
Kollsman or of both in concurrence could be classified as negligent, any negli-
gent acts involved would seem too remote and hidden to be adequately un-
covered by such devices as res ipsa loquitur. The plaintiff in such situations
has virtually no remedy. At best he has the hollow theory of an action for
negligence which, in cases where due care can be proved or where devices
such as res ipsa loquitur cannot uncover negligent conduct, will subject him
to nonsuit. This lack of effective remedy presents a social problem which war-
rants the imposition of a theory of liability other than negligence. A theory of
strict liability where negligence need not be proved seems the obvious solution.
Such a theory, based not on fault, imposes liability upon the actor whose con-
duct, although not necessarily negligent, is the source of the "creation of an
undue risk of harm to other members of the community."3 2 Such imposition is
justifiable because of the economic position of the manufacturer to bear the
losses and spread the risks as contrasted with the economic position and risk-
spreading capacity of the innocent user.33 It is also justifiable from the considera-
tion of the relative positions of the manufacturer and the user with respect to
the creation of the risk of harm. A further justification for strict liability here
is the imposition of strict liability in other product areas such as food and in-
herently dangerous instrumentalities, as well as express warranty cases.
Goldberg is of great significance because it creates liability where none
existed before. Manufacturers are now strictly liable to all intended users of
their products. But the Court's limitation of liability to the manufacturer-
30. Instant case at 440, 191 N.E.2d at 85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 598 (Footnote omitted.).
31. Ibid.
32. Prosser, Torts § 56, at 318 (2d ed. 1955) (Footnote omitted.). See generally Keeton,
supra note 21.
33. See Keeton, supra note 21, at 441.
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assembler alone, where adequacy of remedy is present, raises problems that
may well outweigh the beneficial aspects of the decision. First, the limitation
as to defendants on the basis of adequacy is unexplained and unprecedented;
it does not follow logically from the reasoning of the Court with respect to
the basis upon which it created its rule of strict liability. Second, this tenu-
ous test of adequacy, vague and unexplained by the Court, will necessarily
prove difficult in application.
With respect to the first problem, the Court here created a rule attributing
strict liability to manufacturers, but refused to apply it to the manufacturer of
a defective component part. The more active conduct in the creation of the risk
of harm was that of the manufacturer of the altimeter. Nonnegligent creation
of risk of harm to airline passengers from defective altimeters could reasonably
and justly be made the predicate for strict warranty liability.3 4 The majority's
implication is strong that where the remedy is inadequate as against the manu-
facturer-assembler, strict liability will be extended to the component part
manufacturer. Yet, no explanation is given by the Court for this limitation.
Considering that the conduct of both manufacturers concurred in the creation
of the risk, this conclusion of limitation does not logically follow. One effect of
the limitation is that it renders joinder impossible where adequacy of remedy
is present, thus depriving the manufacturer-assembler of pro rata contribution.
Multiple litigation will be another undesirable result, for the manufacturer-
assembler may seek to recover its losses against the component part manufac-
turer in a separate action, or implead the component part manufacturer into the
original action. The active participation of the component part manufacturer
should be made the basis of strict liability if the manufacturer-assembler's
participation, which appears less consequential by comparison, is so remediable.
The most just solution, in cases where a manufacturer of a defective component
part is involved, would seem to be to allow proceeding against both manu-
facturers jointly, regardless of adequacy of remedy.
The second, and more perplexing problem arises out of the Court's un-
defined test of adequacy of remedy. Foremost in doubt is the question of what
standards adequacy of remedy consists. Does the financial stability of the
manufacturer-assembler constitute adequacy? Will inability or difficulty in
obtaining jurisdiction over the manufacturer-assembler amount to inadequacy
of remedy? Will difficulties in the enforcement of. a possible judgment enter
into the question of adequacy? Or is adequacy of remedy a combination of
all of these and other factors? Further in issue is whether a prospective plaintiff
is in a position to determine adequacy of remedy prior to commencing his
action. Among other adverse effects of this vague test will be the hindrance of
34. Cf. Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932) (exploding
pop bottle: bottle manufacturer liable in action against manufacturer and bottler) ; Mueller
v. Teichner, 6 N.Y.2d 903, 161 N.E.2d 14, 190 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1959). See generally 1 Frumer
& Friedman, Products Liability § 10.02 (1963).
35. N.Y. CPLR § 1401; cf. McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige (Lloyd Royal)
SA., 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1952).
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the lawyer in his role as predictor, e.g., determining against whom to proceed.
Also, the test forces prospective plaintiffs to establish adequacy or inadequacy
of remedy prior to commencing suit, a burden of no little consequence. A further
problem can be conceived where a plaintiff proceeds against the manufacturer-
assembler alone, and it subsequently develops that the remedy is not adequate,
e.g., by reason of intervening bankruptcy of the manufacturer-assembler. How
is this plaintiff to proceed against the component part manufacturer if the
statute of limitations has run? Further will be the results of causing plaintiffs
to possibly undergo the time and expense of several suits should inadequacy of
remedy rear its head late in the proceeding against the manufacturer-assembler.
A complete prediction of the adverse effects of the adequacy of remedy test
would approach the impossible.
The test of adequacy of remedy detracts from the major holding of the
case. It places burdens upon the action against a manufacturer for strict liability
that will only impair the beneficial aspects of the remedy, in cases where com-
ponent part manufacturers are involved. Judicial elaboration of the test could
conceivably develop a monster of the law. The only solution is to abolish the
test. Otherwise the evil of privity will have been replaced by an evil of undeter-
mined nature and scope.
Goldberg represents a tremendously significant step in the development of
New York tort law. The rule is clear: strict liability to all intended users despite
privity of contract between such users and the manufacturer. But, the problems
that will arise from the tenuous test of adequacy of remedy are many. The
test serves no apparent purpose, and its main effects will be devastatingly det-
rimental to the rule of strict liability in products cases involving manufacturers
of component parts. Unless the Court can come forward with both a convincing
rationale for the failure to extend strict liability to a component part manufac-
turer where the remedy against the manufacturer-assembler is adequate, and
define workable standards for the test of adequate remedy, this limitation
should be overruled at the first opportunity.
Thomas C. Mack
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW
Plaintiff, a construction inspector for the New York City Transit Authority,
sued to recover for a personal injury allegedly resulting from the negligent
maintenance of a trench dug by defendant. While inspecting a subway con-
struction site, plaintiff suffered a broken leg when the side of an unsupported
trench collapsed as he stepped across it. A contract between the defendant
and the Authority provided that defendant shore up the sides of excavations,
provide "necessary or convenient" facilities for personnel, and be responsible
for work connected injuries. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed on the law
and the facts, and the complaint dismissed by the Appellate Division, which
found that there was no actionable negligence on defendant's part and addition-
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